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Abstract
Computer-aided decision making—where a human decision-maker is aided by a computa-
tional classifier in making a decision—is becoming increasingly prevalent. For instance, judges
in at least nine states make use of algorithmic tools meant to determine “recidivism risk scores”
for criminal defendants in sentencing, parole, or bail decisions. A subject of much recent debate
is whether such algorithmic tools are “fair” in the sense that they do not discriminate against
certain groups (e.g., races) of people.
Our main result shows that for “non-trivial” computer-aided decision making, either the
classifier must be discriminatory, or a rational decision-maker using the output of the classifier
is forced to be discriminatory. We further provide a complete characterization of situations
where fair computer-aided decision making is possible.
∗Supported in part by NSF Award CNS-1561209, NSF Award CNS-1217821, AFOSR Award FA9550-15-1-0262,
a Microsoft Faculty Fellowship, and a Google Faculty Research Award.
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1 Introduction
As more and more data is becoming easily available, and with vast increases in the power of machine
learning, there are an increasing number of situations where algorithms—classifiers—are used to
help decision makers in challenging situations. Examples range from algorithms assisting drivers
in cars, to algorithmic methods for determining credit scores, to algorithms helping judges to make
sentencing and pretrial decisions in criminal justice. While such computer-aided decision making
has presented unparalleled levels of accuracy and is becoming increasingly ubiquitous, one of the
primary concerns with its widespread adoption is the possibility for such algorithmic methods
to lead to structural biases and discriminatory practices [12]. A malicious algorithm designer,
for instance, might explicitly encode discriminatory rules into a classifier. Perhaps even more
problematically, a machine learning method may overfit the data and infer a bias, may inherit a
bias from poorly collected data, or may simply be designed to optimize some loss function that
leads to discriminatory outcomes.
A well-known instance where this concern has come to light is the debate surrounding the COM-
PAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) tool for recidivism
analysis, a classification algorithm that is becoming increasingly widely used in the criminal justice
system. Given a series of answers to questions concerning criminal defendants’ backgrounds and
characteristics, this tool outputs scores from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high risk) estimating how likely
they are to recidivate (commit a future crime) or to recidivate violently. According to a recent
study by ProPublica [2], COMPAS and similar risk assessment algorithms are becoming increas-
ingly widely-used throughout the United States; their results are already being shown to judges
in nine states during criminal sentencing, and are used in courts nationwide for pretrial decisions
such as assigning bail. The ProPublica study, however, found an alarming trend in a set of data
collected [1] concerning individuals’ COMPAS results and their actual rates of recidivism over the
next two years; in particular, it was found that the scores output by COMPAS lead to a disparate
treatment of minorities. For instance, in the data collected, African-American defendants who did
not recidivate were found to be almost twice as likely as white defendants (44.85%, compared to
23.45%) to have been assigned a high risk score (5-10).
Fairness, or non-discrimination, in classification has been studied and debated extensively in
the recent past (see [3] for an extremely thorough overview); research concerning definitions of
fairness in classification dates back to the works of Pearl [11] and Dwork et al. [6], with more recent
definitions tailored to deal with the above-mentioned problems appearing in [2,4,7,9]. To make this
setting more concrete, consider some distribution D from which individuals σ are sampled, and
consider some classifier C(·) that given some observable features O(σ) produces some outcome,
which later will be used by a decision-maker (DM). The DM is ultimately only interested in the
actual class f(σ) ∈ Ψ of the individual σ, and their goal is to output some decision x ∈ ΩDM
correlated with this actual class. For instance, in the setting of the COMPAS data collected in [1,2],
D is the distribution over defendants σ, the class f(σ) is a bit indicating whether the defendant σ
actually commits a crime in the next two years, and the job of the classifier is to output a risk score,
which will then be seen and acted upon by a judge. Note that we may without loss of generality
assume that the class of the individual is fully determined by σ—situations where the class is
probabilistically decided (e.g., at the time of classification, it has yet to be determined whether an
individual will or won’t recidivate) can be captured by simply including these future coin-tosses
needed to determine it into σ, and simply making sure they are not part of the observable features
O(σ).
2
Additionally, an individual σ is part of some group g(σ) ∈ G—for instance, in the COMPAS
setting, the group is the race of the individual. We will refer to the tuple P = (D, f, g,O) as a
classification context. Given such a classification context P, we let ΨP denote the range of f ,
and GP denote the range of g. Whenever the classification context P is clear from context, we
drop the subscript; additionally, whenever the distribution D, g are clear from context, we use σ to
denote a random variable that is distributed according to D, and σX to denote the random variable
distributed according to D conditioned on g(σ) = X.
In this work, we will explore a tension between fairness for the classifier and fairness for
the DM. Roughly speaking, our main result shows that except in “trivial” classification contexts,
either the classifier needs to be discriminatory, or a rational decision-maker using the output of the
classifier is forced to be discriminatory. Let us turn to describing these two different perspectives
on fairness.
Fairness for the Classifier: Fair Treatment The notion of statistical parity [6] (which is
essentially identical to the notion of causal effect [11]) captures non-discrimination between groups
by simply requiring that the output of the classifier be independent (or almost independent) of the
group of the individual; that is, for any two groups X and Y , the distributions {C(O(σX ))} and
{C(O(σY ))} are ǫ-close in statistical distance. This is a very strong notion of fairness, and in the
above-mentioned context it may not make sense. In particular, if the base rates (i.e. the proba-
bilities that individuals from different groups are part of a certain class) are different, we should
perhaps not expect the output distribution of the classifier to be the same across groups. Indeed,
as the ProPublica article points out, in the COMPAS example, the overall recidivism probability
among African-American defendants was 56%, whereas it was 42% among white defendants. Thus,
in such situations, one would reasonably expect a classifier to on average output a higher risk score
for African-American defendants, which would violate statistical parity. Indeed, the issue raised by
ProPublica authors was that, even after taking this base difference into account (more precisely,
even after conditioning on individuals that did not recidivate), there was a significant difference in
how the classifier treated the two races.
The notion of equalized odds due to Hardt et al. [7] formalizes the desiderata articulated by the
authors of the ProPublica study (for the case of recidivism) in a general setting by requiring the
output of the classifier to be independent of the group of the individuals, after conditioning on the
class of the individuals.1 We here consider an approximate version of this notion—which we refer
to as ǫ-fair treatment—which requires that, for any two groups X and Y and any class c, the
distributions
• {C(O(σX )) | f(σX) = c}
• {C(O(σY )) | f(σY ) = c}
are ǫ-close with respect to some appropriate distance metric to be defined shortly. That is, in
the COMPAS example, if we restrict to individuals that actually do not recidivate (respectively,
those that do), the output of the classifier ought to be essentially independent of the group of the
individual (just as intuitively desired by the authors of the ProPublica study, and as explictly put
forward in [7]).
1Very similar notions of fairness appear also in the works of [4,9] using different names.
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We will use the notion of max-divergence to determine the “distance” between distributions;
this notion, often found in areas such as differential privacy (see [5]), represents this distance
as (the logarithm of) the maximum multiplicative gap between the probabilities of some element
in the respective distributions. We argue that using such a multiplicative distance is important
to ensure fairness between groups that may be under-represented in the data (see Appendix B).
Furthermore, as we note (see Theorem 4 in Appendix A), such a notion is closed under “post-
processing”: if a classifier C satisfies ǫ-fair treatment with respect to a context P = (D, f, g,O),
then for any (possibly probabilistic) function M, C′(·) =M(C(·)) will also satisfy ǫ-fair treatment
with respect to P. Closure under post-processing is important as we ultimately want the decision-
maker to act on the output of the classifier, and we would like the decision-maker’s output to be
fair whenever they act only on the classifier’s output.2
As shown in the ProPublica study, the COMPAS classifier does not satisfy ǫ-fair treatment even
for somewhat large ǫ. However, several recent works have presented methods to “sanitize” unfair
classifiers into ones satisfying ǫ-fair treatment with only a relatively small loss in accuracy [7,10,13].
Fairness for the Decision-Maker: Rational Fairness. So, classifiers satisfying ǫ-fair treat-
ment with accuracy closely matching the optimal “unfair” classifiers are possible (in fact, classifiers
such as COMPAS can be sanitized to satisfy ǫ-fair treatment, without losing too much in accu-
racy). Additionally, as we have noted, the notion of fair treatment is closed under post-processing,
so any mechanism that is applied to the output of the classifier will preserve fair treatment. Thus,
intuitively, we would hope that the entire “computer-aided decision making process”, where the
decision-maker makes use of the classifier’s output to make a decision, results in a fair outcome
as long as the classifier satisfies fair treatment. Indeed, if the decision-maker simply observes the
outcome of the classifier and bases their decision entirely on this outcome, this will be the case (by
closure under post-processing).
But the decision-maker is not a machine; rather we ought to think of the DM as a rational
agent, whose goal is to make decisions that maximize some internal utility function. (For instance,
in the context of COMPAS, the DM might be a judge that wants to make sure that defendants
that are likely to recidivate are sent to jail, and those who do not are released). As far as we are
aware, such a computer-aided “rational” decision-making scenario has not previously been studied.
More precisely, the DM is actually participating in a Bayesian game [8], where individuals σ are
sampled from D, the DM gets to see the group, g(σ), of the individual and the outcome, c = C(σ),
of the classifier (e.g., the individual’s race and risk score), and then needs to select some action
x ∈ ΩDM (e.g., what sentence to render), and finally receives some utility u(f(σ), x) that is only
a function of the actual class f(σ) (e.g., whether the individual would have recidivated) and their
decision x.
Given a classification context P, a classifier C, action space ΩDM and a utility function u, let
ΓP,C,ΩDM,u denote the Bayesian game induced by the above process. We argue that in a computer-
aided decision-making scenario, a natural fairness desideratum for a classifier C for a context P
is that it should “enable fair rational decision-making”. More precisely, we say that a strategy
s : GP ×{0, 1}∗ → ΩDM for the DM (which chooses a decision based on the group of the individual
2We note that an earlier approximate definition was proposed by Kleinberg et al. [9], which simply required that
the expectations of the distributions are close; while this is equivalent to our definition for the case of binary outcomes,
it is weaker for non-binary outcomes (as in the case of the COMPAS classifier), and, as we note (also in Appendix
B), this notion is not closed under post-processing.
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and the output of the classifier) is fair if the DM ignores the group g of the individual and only
bases its decision on the output of the classifier—that is, there exists some s′ : {0, 1}∗ → ΩDM such
that s(g, o) = s′(o). We next say that C enables ǫ-approximately fair decision making (or
simply satisfies ǫ-rational fairness) with respect to the context P = (D, f, g,O) if, for every finite
action space ΩDM and every utility function u : Ψ×ΩDM → [0, 1] (i.e., depending on the individual’s
class and the action selected by the DM), there exists an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium s in the
induced game ΓP,C,ΩDM,u where s is fair.
Note that if there exists ΩDM, u for which there there does not exist some fair ǫ-Nash equilibrium
in the induced game, then there exist situations in which a DM can gain more than ǫ in utility
by discriminating between groups, and thus in such situations a rational DM (that cares about
“significant” > ǫ changes in utility) would be forced to do so.
1.1 Our Main Theorem
Our main result shows that the above-mentioned notions of fairness—which both seem intuitively
desirable—are largely incompatible, except in “trivial” cases. In fact, we provide a tight charac-
terization of classification contexts that admit classifiers satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-rational
fairness.
The case of binary classes (warm-up). As a warm-up, let us start by explaining our char-
acterization for the case of binary classes. (Considering the binary case will also enable better
comparing our result to earlier results in the literature that exclusively focused on the binary case.)
We refer to a a classification context P = (D, f, g,O) as binary if ΨP = {0, 1}.
We say that a binary classification context P = (D, f, g,O) is ǫ-trivial if either (a) for every
class c ∈ {0, 1}, the “base rates” of c are ǫ-close with respect to any pair of groups, or (b) the
observable features enable perfectly distinguishing between the two classes. Formally, either of the
following conditions hold:
• (“almost equal base rates”): for any two groups X,Y in GP , and any class c ∈ ΨP , the
multiplicative distance between Pr[f(σX) = c] and Pr[f(σY ) = c] is at most ǫ;
• (“perfect distinguishability”): the distributions {O(σ) | f(σ) = 0} and {O(σ) | f(σ) = 1}
have disjoint support.
Note that if base rates are ǫ-close, there is a trivial classifier that satisfies 0-fair treatment and
ǫ-rational fairness: namely, ignore the input and simply output some canonical value. Additionally,
note that if the observable features fully determine the class of the individual, there also exists
a classifier trivially satisfying 0-fair treatment and 0-rational fairness: simply output the correct
class of the individual based on the observable features (which fully determine it by assumption).
So ǫ-trivial binary classification contexts admit classifiers satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-rational
fairness. Our characterization result shows that the above contexts are the only ones which admit
them.
Theorem 1. (Characterizing binary contexts.) Consider a binary classification context P =
(D, f, g,O), and let ǫ ≤ 3/2 be a constant. Then:
(1) If P is ǫ-trivial, there exists a classifier C satisfying 0-fair treatment and 2ǫ-rational fairness
with respect to P.
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(2) If there exists a classifier C satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ/5-rational fairness with respect
to P, then P is 4ǫ-trivial.
As we shall discuss in more detail in Section 1.2, a similar notion of triviality was considered
in [4, 9] who obtained related characterizations for binary classifications tasks (but considering
different notions of fairness/accuracy).
The general case. To deal with the general (i.e., non-binary) case, we need to consider a more
general notion of a trivial context. The definition of triviality is actually somewhat different from
the definition given for the binary case, but its not hard to see that for this special case the
definitions are equivalent.
We say that a classification context P = (D, f, g,O) is ǫ-trivial if there exists a partition of
the set ΨP into subsets Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,Ψm of classes such that both of the following conditions hold:
• (“base-rates conditioned on Ψi are close”): for any i ∈ [m], for any two groups X,Y in GP ,
and any class c ∈ Ψi, the multiplicative distance between Pr[f(σX) = c | f(σX) ∈ Ψi] and
Pr[f(σY ) = c | f(σY ) ∈ Ψi] is at most ǫ;
• (“perfect distinguishability between Ψi and Ψj”): for any i 6= j ∈ [m] the distributions
{O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψi} and {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψj} have disjoint support.
Note that in contrast to the definition given for binary context, the general definition requires that
both of the above conditions hold (as opposed to just one of them). Note, however, that in case we
only have 2 classes, there are only 2 possible partitions of ΨP : either we have the trivial partition
Ψ1 = {0, 1} in which case condition 1 is equivalent to requiring equal base rates, and condition 2
trivially holds; or Ψ1 = {0},Ψ2 = {1}, in which case condition 1 trivially holds, and condition 2 is
equivalent to prefect distinguishability between class 0 and class 1.
Once again, if a classification context is ǫ-trivial, there exists a simple classifier that satisfies
ǫ-fair treatment and O(ǫ)-rational fairness: given some observable features o, determine which
subgroup Ψi the individual belongs to (which we know can be done by the second requirement),
and finally output i. Roughly speaking, this classifier satisfies 0-fair treatment since for any i and
any class c ∈ Ψi, all individuals in Ψi receive the same outcome (namely, i). Rational fairness is
a bit more tricky to prove, but roughly speaking follows from the fact that, conditioned on any
classification outcome i, the group g of the individual carries “O(ǫ) information” about the actual
class of the individual, and so, by ignoring it, the DM loses little in utility. Our main theorem
shows that ǫ-triviality is also a necessary condition:
Theorem 2. (Full characterization.) Consider some classification context P = (D, f, g,O), let
ǫ ≤ 3/2 be a constant and let k = |ΨP | (i.e., the number of classes). Then:
(1) If P is ǫ-trivial, there exists a classifier C satisfying 0-fair treatment and 2ǫ-rational fairness
with respect to P.
(2) If there exists a classifier C satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ/5-rational fairness with respect
to P, then P is 4(k − 1)ǫ-trivial.
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1.2 Related Work
Several recent works also show obstacles to achieving fair classifications. Notably, the elegant result
by Kleinberg et al. [9] shows that (in our terminology), for non-trivial binary classification problems,
there are no classifiers that satisfy ǫ-fair treatment (in fact, an expectation-based relaxation of the
notion we consider) as well as a notion of ǫ-group calibration—roughly speaking, ǫ-group calibration
requires that conditioned on any outcome and group, the distributions of individuals’ actual classes
are (approximately) “calibrated” according to the outcome3. Calibration, however, is best thought
of as an “accuracy” notion for the classifier (rather than a fairness notion), and may not always
be easy to achieve even without any concern for fairness. (Additionally, the results from [9] show
a weaker bound than those we present here, namely that both of the ǫ-approximate notions they
consider in conjunction imply O(
√
ǫ) difference in base rates or O(
√
ǫ) prediction error; we present a
stronger, asymptotically tight, bound implying either O(ǫ) difference in base rates or exact perfect
prediction. However, we note that this is largely due to the fact that the actual definitions employed
are incomparable.)
A different elegant work by Chouldechova in [4] presents a similar impossibility result. She also
focuses on binary classification contexts, and further restricts her attention to classifiers outputting
a single bit. She points out a simple identity (a direct consequence of the definition of conditional
probabilities) which implies that, in non-trivial binary classification contexts, and for binary classi-
fiers (i.e., classifiers only outputting a single bit), 0-fair treatment is incompatible with a notion of
perfect “predictive parity”—namely, that conditioned on the classifier outputting b, the probability
that the class is b is independent of the group. While her result only applies in a quite limited set-
ting (binary context, binary classifiers, and only rules out “perfect” fair treatment combined with
“perfect” predictive parity), we will rely on an identity similar to hers in one step of our proof. We
will also rely on a generalized version of a notion of predictive parity (which deals with non-binary
classes, non-binary outcomes, and non-zero error in predictivity) as an intermediate notion within
the proof of our main theorem.
As far as we know, no earlier results have considered the effect of having a rational decision-
maker act based on the output of the classifier. Furthermore, none of the earlier impossibility
results consider non-binary classification problems.
Finally, we mention that, on a conceptual level, our characterization is related to impossibility
results for social choice, such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [?, ?], which demonstrate
limitations of “fair” and strategy-proof voting rules.
1.3 Proof Outline
We here provide an outline of the proof of the main theorem. We start by considering just binary
classification contexts P = (D, f, g,O), and then show how to extend the proof to deal also with
non-binary contexts. As mentioned above, for binary contexts, the “if” direction of the theorem (i.e.,
showing that trivial contexts admit fair classifiers) is immediate. The “only if” direction requires
showing that the existence of a classifier C that satisfies ǫ-fair treatment as well as ǫ/5-rational
fairness for a context P implies that P is O(ǫ)-trivial.
3For instance, in the COMPAS example, calibration might require that, of people in each group assigned a risk score
of 5, approximately 50% will recidivate, and among those assigned a risk score of 3, approximately 30% recidivate.
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Predictive parity. Towards showing this, we introduce a generalized version of the notion of
“predictive parity” considered by Chouldechova [4] (this notion will later also be useful in proving
the “if” direction for the non-binary classification case). Roughly speaking, we say that a classifier
satisfies ǫ-predictive parity if, for any two groups X and Y , the following distributions are ǫ-close
in multiplicative distance:
• {f(σX) | C(O(σX )) = c}
• {f(σX) | C(O(σX )) = c}
That is, the output of the classifier is “equally predictive” of the actual class between groups.
Relating predictive parity and rational fairness. Our first result (which works for all, and
not just binary, contexts) shows that rational fairness and predictive parity are intimately con-
nected. First of all, ǫ-predictive parity implies O(ǫ)-rational fairness—intuitively, if a DM could
gain by discriminating, then there must exist some output for the classifier for which such a gain
is possible, and this contradicts predictive parity. This forward direction turns out to be useful
for proving that all ǫ-trivial contexts (even non-binary ones) admit classifiers satisfying ǫ-rational
fairness and ǫ-fair treatment; that is, the “if” direction of the theorem (also for non-binary contexts.)
More interestingly, we show that ǫ/5 rational fairness (for ǫ < 3/2), combined with ǫ′-fair treat-
ment (for any ǫ′), implies ǫ-predictive parity. Intuitively, we show this as follows. Consider some
C that does not satisfy ǫ-predictive parity, yet satisfies ǫ/5-rational fairness and ǫ′-fair treatment.
This means there exists some class y∗, groups g, g′ and some outcome o such that the prevalence
of y∗ is significantly higher in group g than in group g′ conditioned on the classifier outputting o.
We then construct a very natural game for the DM where every fair strategy has low utility
compared to the optimal unfair strategy, which would contradict rational fairness. The action space
of the games consists of two actions {Risky,Safe}. If the DM chooses Safe they always receive some
fixed utility u∗. On the other hand, if they choose Risky, they receive 1 if the individual’s class is
y∗ and 0 otherwise. That is, playing Risky is good if the individual is “good” (i.e., in class y∗) and
otherwise not.
We next show, relying on the fact that C satisfies fair treatment and the fact that the prevalence
of y∗ is significantly higher conditioned on the DM getting the signal (o, g) than when getting (o, g′),
that, if we set u∗ (i.e, the utility of playing Safe) appropriately, the DM can always significantly
gain by discriminating between g and g′. The intriguing aspect of this proof is that the optimal
“fair” strategy for the DM turns out to be a mixed strategy (i.e., a probabilistic strategy) which
mixes uniformly between the two actions Risky and Safe.
Simultaneously achieving fair treatment and predictive parity (binary contexts). Given
that O(ǫ)-rational fairness combined with (any finite-error) fair treatment implies O(ǫ)-predictive
parity, to prove the theorem, it will suffice to show that only trivial contexts admit classifiers that
simultaneously satisfy O(ǫ)-fair treatment and O(ǫ)-predictive parity.
Towards showing this, let us first focus on binary classification contexts. We first note that,
by the definition of conditional probability, for any X ∈ GP , i, j ∈ ΨP , and o ∈ ΩCP , the following
identity holds:
Pr[f(σX) = j | C(O(σX )) = o]
Pr[f(σX) = i | C(O(σX)) = o]
Pr[C(O(σX )) = o | f(σX) = i]
Pr[C(O(σX)) = o | f(σX) = j] =
Pr[f(σX) = j]
Pr[f(σX) = i]
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This identity is basically a generalization of an identity observed by Chouldechova [4] for the special
case of binary classification tasks and binary classifiers; it relates the conditional probabilities
defining fair treatment and predictive parity (the first and second terms on the left, respectively)
to the base rates of classes between any two groups (the terms on the right).
The same identity holds for any Y ∈ GP :
Pr[f(σY ) = j | C(O(σY )) = o]
Pr[f(σY ) = i | C(O(σY )) = o]
Pr[C(O(σY )) = o | f(σY ) = i]
Pr[C(O(σY )) = o | f(σY ) = j] =
Pr[f(σY ) = j]
Pr[f(σY ) = i]
By applying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-predictive parity, we get that the left-hand sides on the above
two identities are 4ǫ-close, and as a consequence we have that the ratios
Pr[f(σX) = j]
Pr[f(σX) = i]
and
Pr[f(σY ) = j]
Pr[f(σY ) = i]
are 4ǫ-close. (Note that, to perform these manipulations, it is important that we rely on the
multiplicative distance notion; the reason we now get a distance of 4ǫ is that we apply fair treatment
or predictive parity four times, and each time we do this we lose a factor of eǫ). For the case of
binary classification contexts, letting αgb = Pr[f(σg) = b] denote the “base rate” of class b for group
g, this means that the ratios
αX1
αX0
=
αX1
1− αX1
and
αY1
αY0
=
αY1
1− αY1
are 4ǫ-close, and thus we have that the base rates αX1 , α
Y
1 must be 4ǫ-close (and the same for α
X
0 ,
αY0 ).
But there is a catch. We can only apply the above identity when it is well-defined—that is,
when there are no divisions by zero. In other words, we can only apply it if there exists some
outcome o such that
Pr[C(O(σ)) = o ∧ f(σ) = 0] > 0 and Pr[C(O(σ)) = o ∧ f(σ) = 1] > 0.
If there is no such outcome, C perfectly distinguishes between the two classes, and thus
{O(σ) | f(σ) = 0} and {O(σ) | f(σ) = 1}
must have disjoint support. Hence, in either case, P is a 4ǫ-trivial context.
Simultaneously achieving fair treatment and predictive parity (general contexts). Deal-
ing with non-binary contexts is quite a bit more involved, and we content ourselves to simply provide
a very high-level overview. Consider some C that satisfies ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-predictive parity
with respect to P = (D, f, g,O); our goal is again to show that P must be O(ǫ)-trivial.
At a high level, we will show either that base rates are ǫ-close or that we can split the set of
classes ΨP into proper subsets Ψ1,Ψ2 such that the classifier can perfectly distinguish between
these sets of classes. Once we have shown this property, we can next repeatedly rely on it to prove
the theorem (more precisely, by recursively splitting up either Ψ1 or Ψ2 and applying the same
result; formally doing this turns out to be somewhat subtle.)
To prove the above property, our goal is to use the same high-level approach as in the binary
case. Assume that there do not exist Ψ1 and Ψ2 such that C can perfectly distinguish between
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them, and let us show that then the base rates must be close. In order to apply the same argument
as in the binary case, we would need to show that for all pairs of classes (i, j), the above identity
can be applied. If we do this, then we have that, for all (i, j), the ratios
Pr[f(σX) = j]
Pr[f(σX) = i]
and
Pr[f(σY ) = j]
Pr[f(σY ) = i]
are 4ǫ-close, from which we can conclude that the base rates are 4ǫ-close. However, the fact that
C cannot distinguish between two proper subsets of classes does not mean that all classes are
“ambiguous” with respect to C (in the sense that C cannot perfectly tell them apart, and thus
the identity is well-defined). Instead, what we show is that, under the assumption that there do
not exist two proper subsets of classes between which C can perfectly distinguish, we have that,
between any two classes i and j, there exists a sequence of classes (i1, . . . , in) such that n ≤ k (k
being the number of classes), i1 = i, in = j, and any two consecutive classes must be “ambiguous”.
Ambiguity between classes with respect to C turns out to be exactly the condition under which the
above identity is well defined. At a very high level, we can then perform a “hybrid argument” over
the classes in the sequence to still conclude that, for all pairs of classes (i, j), the ratios
Pr[f(σX) = j]
Pr[f(σX) = i]
and
Pr[f(σY ) = j]
Pr[f(σY ) = i]
are 4(k − 1)ǫ-close; this suffices to conclude that the base rates between groups are close.
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
2.1 Notation
Conditional probabilities. Given some random variable X and some event E, we let Pr[p(X) |
E] denote the probability of a predicate p(X) holding when conditioning the probability space on the
event E. If the probability of E is 0, we slightly abuse notation and simply define Pr[p(X) | E] = 0.
Multiplicative distance. The following definition of multiplicative distance will be useful to us.
We let the multiplicative distance µ(x, y) between two real numbers x, y ≥ 0 be defined as
µ(x, y) =


ln
(
max
(
x
y ,
y
x
))
if x > 0, y > 0
0 if x = y = 0
∞ otherwise
2.2 Classification Context
We start by defining classification contexts and classifiers.
Definition 1. A classification context P is denoted by a tuple (D, f, g,O) such that:
• D is a probability distribution with some finite support ΣP (the set of all possible individuals
to classify).
• f : ΣP → ΨP is a surjective function that maps each individual to their class in a set ΨP .
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• g : ΣP → GP is a surjective function that maps each individual to their group in a set GP .
• O : ΣP → {0, 1}∗ is a function that maps each individual to their observable features.4
We note that f and g are deterministic; this is without loss of generality as we can encode
any probabilistic features that f and g may depend on into σ as “unobservable features” of the
individual.
Given such a classification context P, we let ΨP denote the range of f , and GP denote the
range of g. Whenever the classification context P is clear from context, we drop the subscript;
additionally, whenever the distribution D and group function g are clear from context, we use σ to
denote a random variable that is distributed according to D, and σX to denote the random variable
distributed according to D conditioned on g(σ) = X.
A classifier C for a classification context P = (D, f, g,O) is simply a (possibly randomized)
algorithm. We let ΩC
P
denote the support of the distribution {C(σ)}.
2.3 Fair Treatment
Next we define the notion of fair treatment, an approximate version of the notion of “equalized
odds” from Hardt et al. [7] (which in turn was derived from notions implicit in the ProPublica
study [2]).
Definition 2. We say that a classifier C satisfies ǫ-fair treatment with respect to a context
P = (D, f, g,O) if, for any groups X,Y ∈ GP , any class c ∈ ΨP , and any outcome o ∈ ΩCP , we have
that
µ(Pr[C(O(σX)) = o | f(σX) = c],Pr[C(O(σY )) = o | f(σY ) = c]) ≤ ǫ
Note that for the case of binary classification tasks and binary classifiers (i.e., when ΨP = Ω
C
P
=
{0, 1}), fair treatment is equivalent to requiring “similar” false positive and false negative rates.
2.4 Rational Fairness
We turn to introducing our notion of “fairness with respect to rational decision-makers”. Towards
this goal, given a classification context P and a classifier C, we consider a single-player Bayesian
game Γ where individuals σ are sampled from D, the decision-maker (DM) gets to see the group
g(σ) of the individual and the outcome o = C(σ) of the classifier, and then selects some action
x ∈ ΩDM. They then receive utility u(f(σ), x) that is only a function of the actual class f(σ) and
their decision x. We let ΓP,C,ΩDM,u denote the Bayesian game induced by the above process (for
some action space ΩDM and utility function u). Given such a game Γ
P,C,ΩDM,u, a pure strategy
for the DM is a function s : GP×ΩCP → ΩDM, and amixed strategy is a probability distribution
over pure strategies. In the sequel, we simply use the term “strategy” to refer to mixed strategies.
Definition 3. We say that a strategy s is ǫ-optimal in ΓP,C,ΩDM,u where P = (D, f, g,O), if for
all (g, o) in the support of {(g(σ)), C(O(σ))} and any strategy s′, we have:
eǫE[u(f(σ)), s(g, o) | g(σ) = g, C(σ) = o] ≥ E[u(f(σ), s′(g, o)) | g(σ) = g, C(σ) = o]
4This is included for generality; for our result, it suffices to take O to be the identity function, as we can show
impossibility even for classifiers which may observe every feature of an individual.
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That is, a player can never gain more than a factor eǫ in utility by deviating; in other words,
s is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in ΓP,C,ΩDM,u.5 We turn to defining what it means for a strategy to be
fair.
Definition 4. We say that a strategy s for a game ΓP,C,ΩDM,u is fair if there exists a function s˜
such that s(g, o) = s˜(o).
That is, the strategy s does not depend on the group of the individual. As we shall see later
on (see Claim 2), the “best” fair strategy s (i.e., a fair strategy that satisfies ǫ-optimality for the
smallest ǫ) may need to be a mixed strategy—in fact, we demonstrate a game where there is a
significant gap between the best mixed and pure fair strategies. (In our opinion, this is intriguing
in its own right, as mixed strategies are typically not helpful in a decision-theoretic—i.e., single-
player—setting.)
We finally define what it means for a classifier C to enable fair decision making.
Definition 5. We say that C enables ǫ-approximately fair decision making (or simply satisfies
ǫ-rational fairness) with respect to the context P = (D, f, g,O) if, for every finite action space
ΩDM and every utility function u : ΨP × ΩDM → [0, 1], there exists a strategy s that is fair and
ǫ-optimal with respect to ΓP,C,ΩDM,u.
3 Characterizing Fair Classifiers
Our main theorem is a complete characterization of the class of contexts that admit classifiers that
simultaneously satisfy fair treatment and rational fairness.
The following notion of “triviality” will characterize contexts admitting such classifiers.
Definition 6. A classification context P = (D, f, g,O) is ǫ-trivial if there exists a partition of the
set ΨP into subsets Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,Ψm of classes such that the following conditions hold:
(1) For any i ∈ [m], c ∈ Ψi and any two groups X,Y in GP , we have that
µ(Pr[f(σX) = c | f(σX) ∈ Ψi],Pr[f(σY ) = c | f(σY ) ∈ Ψi]) ≤ ǫ
(i.e., the base rates conditioned on Ψi are close between groups)
(2) For any i, j ∈ [m] with i 6= j, the distributions {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψi} and {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψj}
have disjoint support.
Note that if the class space Ψ is binary, triviality means that either the base rates are ǫ-close,
or we can perfectly distinguish between the two classes.
Our main characterization theorem shows that a context P admits classifiers satisfying O(ǫ)-fair
treatment and ǫ-rational fairness if, and only if, P is O(ǫ)-trivial.
5Note that we here use the so-called ex-interim notion of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium which requires s to be ǫ-close
to the optimal strategy even conditioned on the DM having received its type (i.e. (g, o) in our case). This is the
most commonly used notion of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. We mention that there is also a weaker notion of ex-ante
ǫ-Nash equilibrium which only requires s to be optimal a priori before seeing the type. A weaker version of our main
impossibility result holds also for this notion.
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Theorem 3 (Theorem 2, restated). Consider some classification context P = (D, f, g,O) and let
k = |ΨP | (i.e., the number of classes). Then:
(1) For any constant ǫ, if P is ǫ-trivial, then there exists a classifier C satisfying 0-fair treatment
and 2ǫ-rational fairness with respect to P.
(2) For any constant ǫ < 3/2, if there exists a classifier C satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ/5-
rational fairness with respect to P, then P is 4(k − 1)ǫ-trivial.
Note that Theorem 1 from the introduction (i.e., the classification for binary contexts) follows
directly as a special case when k = 2. Additionally, let us remark that Theorem 3 holds even
for a somewhat weaker definition of rational fairness where we only require the existence of a fair
ǫ-equilibrium in games with binary decision spaces (i.e., ΩDM = {0, 1}), and even if we restrict to
this simple and natural subclass of games.
4 Proof of Theorem 3
Towards proving Theorem 3, we first define a notion of ǫ-predictive parity and show that a context
P admits classifiers satisfying ǫ-rational fairness and ǫ-fair treatment if and only if P admits a
classifier satisfying O(ǫ)-predictive parity and ǫ-fair treatment. (We note that predictive parity is
not equivalent to rational fairness, but is so for classifiers that also satisfy fair treatment.)
Next, we show that O(ǫ)-triviality characterizes the set of contexts admitting classifiers satisfy-
ing ǫ-predictive parity and ǫ-rational fairness. (This second step is interesting in its own right, and
can be thought of a significant strengthening of the impossibility result of Chouldechova [4], which
only showed triviality for the special case when ǫ = 0, the classification context is binary, and the
classifier is binary.6)
4.1 Predictive Parity
We first introduce an intermediate notion of approximate “predictive parity” (we are borrowing the
name from Chouldechova in [4], who considered a perfect version of this notion tailored for binary
classifiers, where the class is a single bit and the classifier also outputs only a single bit.) Roughly
speaking, ǫ-predictive parity requires that the distributions of individuals’ classes, conditioned on
a particular outcome, be ǫ-close between groups. We remark that this notion is a strict relaxation
of the notion of ǫ-group calibration considered by Kleinberg et al. [9] (which not only requires that
the distribution of the classes be the same between groups conditioned on the outcome o of the
classifier, but also that the outcome o “accurately predicts” the class).
Definition 7. We say that a classifier C satisfies ǫ-predictive parity with respect to a context
P = (D, f, g,O) if, for any groups X,Y ∈ GP , any outcome o ∈ ΩCP , and any class c ∈ ΨP , we have
that
µ(Pr[f(σX) = c | C(O(σX )) = o],Pr[f(σY ) = c | C(O(σY )) = o]) ≤ ǫ
We next show that predictive parity is closely related to rational fairness (at least, when com-
bined with fair treatment). We first show that ǫ-predictive parity implies O(ǫ)-rational fairness.
6For this special case, her notion of triviality is a special case of our notion of 0-triviality, which requires that
either the base rates are identical for both groups, or one can perfectly predict the class of an individual.
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Claim 1. Let C be a classifier that satisfies ǫ-predictive parity with respect to a context P =
(D, f, g,O). Then C satisfies 2ǫ-rational fairness with respect to P.
Proof. Consider some classifier C satisfying ǫ-predictive parity with respect to a context P. We will
show that C also satisfies 2ǫ-rational fairness with respect to P.
Let T ΓDM denote the support of {(g(σ)), C(O(σ))} (i.e., the support of the type space in the
Bayesian game). Let s∗ be an optimal strategy; we may without loss of generality assume that s∗
is a pure strategy, since for every type (g, o) ∈ T ΓDM there exists a deterministic best response. We
now show how to modify s∗ into a fair strategy s without ever losing too much in expected utility.
For every outcome o, pick some g∗o such that (g
∗
o , o) ∈ T ΓDM , and define s(g, o) = s∗(g∗o , o). Clearly s
is fair. We now show that for every pair (g, o) ∈ T ΓDM , the expected utility of playing s∗ can never
be more than a factor e2ǫ better than the expected utility of playing s, and thus s is 2ǫ-optimal (as
desired).
Assume for contradiction that there exists some (g, o) such that g 6= g∗o and
E[u(f(σ), s∗(g, o)) | g(σ) = g, C(O(σ)) = o] > e2ǫE[u(f(σ), s(g, o) | g(σ) = g, C(O(σ)) = o]
That is,∑
y∈ΨP
Pr[f(σg) = y | C(O(σg)) = o]u(y, s∗(g, o)) > e2ǫ
∑
y∈ΨP
Pr[f(σg) = y | C(O(σg)) = o]u(y, s(g, o))
By applying predictive parity (more precisely, that the multiplicative distance between Pr[f(σg) =
y | C(O(σg)) = o] and Pr[f(σg∗o ) = y | C(O(σg∗o )) = o] is at most ǫ) to both the LHS and the RHS
(we lose a factor eǫ for each application), we get that∑
y∈ΨP
Pr[f(σg∗o ) = y | C(O(σg∗o )) = o]u(y, s∗(g, o)) >
∑
y∈ΨP
Pr[f(σg∗o ) = y | C(O(σg∗o )) = o]u(y, s(g, o))
In other words, (and relying on the fact that s(g, o) = s∗(g∗o , o)),
E[u(f(σ), s∗(g, o)) | g(σ) = g∗o , C(O(σ)) = o] > E[u(f(σ), s∗(g∗o , o) | g(σ) = g∗o , C(O(σ)) = o]
which is a contradiction since, by assumption, s∗(g∗o , o) is an optimal move given the type (g
∗
o , o).
As we next show, any classifier that satisfies ǫ-rational fairness and ǫ′-fair treatment (for any
ǫ′) also satisfies O(ǫ)-predictive parity. Intuitively, we show this as follows. Consider some C that
does not satisfy O(ǫ)-predictive parity, yet satisfies ǫ-rational fairness and ǫ′-fair treatment. This
means there exists some class y∗, groups g, g′ and some outcome o such that the prevalence of y∗
is significantly higher in group g than in group g′ conditioned on the classifier outputting o.
We then construct a very natural game for the DM where every fair strategy has low utility
compared to the optimal unfair strategy. The action space consists of two actions {Risky,Safe}. If
the DM chooses Safe they always receive some fixed utility u∗. On the other hand, if they choose
Risky, they receive 1 if the individual’s class is y∗ and 0 otherwise. That is, playing Risky is good
if the individual is “good” (i.e., in class y∗) and otherwise not.
Assume there exists some fair strategy s that is ǫ-optimal in this game. We first observe that
by ǫ′-fair treatment of C, it must be the case that both (g, o) and (g, o′) are in the support of
{(g(σ)), C(O(σ))} (i.e., the support of the “type distribution” of the game), and thus optimality
of s must hold conditioned on both of them.
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We next use the fact that the prevalence of y∗ is significantly higher conditioned on the DM
getting the signal (o, g) than when getting (o, g′), and thus if we set u∗ (i.e, the utility of playing
Safe) appropriately, we can ensure that the DM gains by discriminating between g and g′ (playing
Risky when the group is g, and Safe otherwise). Interestingly, determining by how much a DM can
gain by discriminating turns out to be somewhat subtle; it turns out that the “best” fair strategy
(i.e., the fair strategy that minimizes the expected utility loss with respect to the optimal strategy)
mixes with probability 1/2 between Risky and Safe.
Claim 2. Let C be a classifier that satisfies log
(
2
1+e−ǫ/2
)
-rational fairness with respect to a context
P = (D, f, g,O), as well as ǫ′-fair treatment with respect to P (for any ǫ′). Then C satisfies
ǫ-predictive parity with respect to P.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that C satisfies log
(
2
1+e−ǫ/2
)
-rational fairness and ǫ′-fair treatment
(with respect to P), yet does not satisfy ǫ-predictive parity (with respect to P).
Let T ΓDM denote the support of {(g(σ)), C(O(σ))} . We first claim that T ΓDM = ΩCP × GP . If
not, since ΩC
P
is the support of C(O(σ)) (and thus for every o ∈ ΩC
P
there is at least one g ∈ GP
for which (o, g) ∈ T ΓDM), there must exist an outcome o ∈ ΩCP and groups g, g′ ∈ GP such that
(o, g) ∈ T ΓDM but (o, g′) 6∈ T ΓDM . This, however, would mean that there is y ∈ ΨP for which the
distributions {C(O(σg)) | f(σg) = y} and {C(O(σg′)) | f(σg′) = y} have different supports (and
hence infinite max-divergence), as, by definition of T ΓDM , o must be in the support of the former
for some y but cannot be in the support of the latter for any y. This contradicts ǫ′-fair treatment
(for any ǫ′) of C.
Next, since C fails to satisfy ǫ-predictive parity, there exist groups g, g′ ∈ GP , class y∗ ∈ ΨP ,
and an outcome o ∈ ΩC
P
such that
Pr[f(σg) = y
∗ | C(O(σg)) = o]
Pr[f(σg′) = y∗ | C(O(σg′)) = o]
> eǫ
Let δ > ǫ be such that
eδ =
Pr[f(σg) = y
∗ | C(O(σg)) = o]
Pr[f(σg′) = y∗ | C(O(σg′)) = o]
and define the “midpoint” p between these probabilities as
p = eδ/2Pr[f(σg′) = y
∗ | C(O(σg′)) = o] = e−δ/2Pr[f(σg) = y∗ | C(O(σg)) = o]
Consider a game where ΩDM = {Risky,Safe}, u(y,Risky) = 1 if y = y∗ and 0 otherwise and
u(·,Safe) = p. The decision-maker’s expected utility for choosing Safe is always p; on the other
hand:
• Conditioned on (o, g), the decision-maker’s expected utility for choosing Risky is
Pr[f(σg) = y
∗ | C(O(σg)) = o] = eδ/2p
• Conditioned on (o, g′), their expected utility for Risky is
Pr[f(σg′) = y
∗ | C(O(σg′)) = o] = e−δ/2p
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Consider some fair pure strategy s for DM. It must choose either Risky or Safe for both (o, g) and
(o, g′). So,
• If s chooses Risky, DM receives e−δ/2p in expected utility conditioned on (o, g′), whereas they
could have received p by instead choosing Safe (thus, they incur a multiplicative loss of eδ/2).
• On the other hand, if s chooses Safe, then the decision-maker receives utility p conditioned
on (o, g), whereas they could have received eδ/2p utility in expectation by instead choosing
Risky (again incurring a multiplicative loss of eδ/2).
Thus, we conclude that any fair pure strategy must lose at least a eδ/2 multiplicative factor in utility
compared to the optimal (unfair) strategy (which chooses Risky for (o, g) and Safe for (o, g′)).
Consider next a fair mixed strategy s that chooses Risky with probability pr (and Safe with
probability 1− pr) for both (o, g) and (o, g′).
• Conditioned on (o, g′), the decision-maker gets pre−δ/2p+(1−pr)p in expected utility, whereas
they could have received p by instead choosing Safe. This results in a multiplicative loss of
pre
−δ/2 + (1− pr).
• Conditioned on (o, g), the decision-maker gets preδ/2p+(1− pr)p in expected utility, whereas
they could have received eδ/2p utility in expectation by instead choosing Risky, yielding a
multiplicative loss of pr + (1− pr)e−δ/2.
Thus, when determining the rational strategy that minimizes the loss, we may without loss of
generality assume that pr ≥ 1/2 (as the case when pr ≤ 1/2 is symmetric simply by renaming pr
and 1− pr), and focus on finding the pr that minimizes
pre
−δ/2 + (1− pr) = 1− pr(1− e−δ/2)
which happens when pr is as small as possible, and thus when pr = 1/2. So the optimal mixed
rational strategy must be pr = 1/2, and thus has a multiplicative loss of
1/2(e−δ/2 + 1) < 1/2(e−ǫ/2 + 1)
for both (o, g) and (o, g′) compared to the optimal unfair strategy. (In particular, using the expected
utilities above, setting pr > 1/2 worsens the multiplicative loss conditioned on (o, g
′) by decreasing
pre
−δ/2 + (1 − pr), and setting pr < 1/2 worsens the multiplicative loss conditioned on (o, g) by
decreasing pr + (1− pr)e−δ/2.)
Hence, the decision-maker gains at least 2
1+e−ǫ/2
utility multiplicatively by switching from any
fair mixed strategy to the optimal unfair strategy, and so we conclude the proof with the contra-
diction that C cannot satisfy log
(
2
1+e−ǫ/2
)
-rational fairness with respect to P.
We note that, for ǫ < 3/2 (in particular, ǫ less than roughly 1.644), we have that log
(
2
1+e−ǫ/2
)
>
ǫ/5, which demonstrates the bounds we show in our other results:
Corollary 1. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 3/2), and let C be a classifier that satisfies ǫ/5-rational fairness with
respect to a context P = (D, f, g,O), as well as ǫ′-fair treatment with respect to P (for any ǫ′).
Then C satisfies ǫ-predictive parity with respect to P.
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An interesting observation (which is not relevant for the sequel of the proof, but nonetheless
insightful) which follows from the above proof is that the optimal fair strategy for the DM in the
above game is a mixed strategy which uniformly mixes between Safe or Risky (each with probability
1/2), whereas any fair pure strategy loses a factor of eǫ/2 (i.e., significantly more) in utility. (We
note, however, that the existence of such a gap between the fair mixed and fair pure strategies can
only arise in games where the optimal strategy is unfair: the existence of an optimal fair mixed
strategy implies the existence of an optimal fair pure strategy.)
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3 (1)
By relying on the fact that predictive parity implies rational fairness, we can now prove the first
part of Theorem 3.
Proposition 1 (Theorem 3 (1).). If P = (D, f, g,O) is an ǫ-trivial context, then there exists a
classifier C that satisfies 0-fair treatment and 2ǫ-rational fairness with respect to P.
Proof. Consider a classifier C that on input y (in the support of O(σ)) recovers some σ such that
O(σ) = y, and then outputs f(σ).
Proving that C satisfies fair treatment: Consider some i ∈ [m] and some class c ∈ Ψi. We
aim to show that for any two groups X,Y ∈ GP and any outcome o, we have that
Pr[C(O(σX )) = o | f(σX) = c] = Pr[C(O(σY )) = o | f(σY ) = c]
First note that, by the first condition in the definition of an ǫ-trivial context (i.e., the “equal base
rate condition”), it follows that c is in the support of {f(σX)} if and only if it is in the support
of {f(σY )}. Next, consider some c in the support of {f(σX)} (and thus also in the support of
{f(σY )}). Let i be such that c ∈ Ψi. Due to the second condition in the definition of an ǫ-trivial
context (i.e., that the distributions {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψj} for j ∈ [m] have disjoint support), it follows
that for every σ such that f(σ) = c, C(O(σ)) always outputs i. Thus,
Pr[C(O(σX )) = i | f(σX) = c] = Pr[C(O(σY )) = i | f(σY ) = c] = 1
which concludes the proof that C satisfies 0-fair treatment.
Proving that C satisfies rational fairness: To show that C satisfies 2ǫ-rational fairness, we
note that, by Claim 1, it suffices to show that C satisfies ǫ-predictive parity. By the first condition
of an ǫ-trivial context, we have that for every i ∈ [m], c ∈ Ψi, and X,Y in GP ,
µ(Pr[f(σX) = c | f(σY ) ∈ Ψi],Pr[f(σY ) = c | f(σY ) ∈ Ψi]) ≤ ǫ
By the disjoint support assumption, we have that C(O(σ)) = i if and only if f(σ) ∈ Ψi, thus we
have
µ(Pr[f(σX) = c | C(O(σX)) = i],Pr[f(σY ) = c | C(O(σY )) = i]) ≤ ǫ
so C satisfies ǫ-predictive parity.
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4.3 Subgroup Perfect Prediction
To prove the second part of Theorem 3, we introduce some additional notions.
Definition 8. We say that a classifier C satisfies subgroup perfect prediction with respect to
context P if there exists a proper subset ψ ⊂ ΨP such that the distributions
{C(O(σ)) | f(σ) ∈ ψ} and {C(O(σ)) | f(σ) 6∈ ψ}
have disjoint support.
To characterize classifiers satisfying subgroup perfect prediction, a notion of “ambiguity between
classes” will be useful.
Definition 9. Given a classifier C and context P, we say that classes i, j ∈ ΨP are ambiguous
(with respect to C and P) if there exists o ∈ ΩC
P
such that Pr[f(σ) = i ∧ C(O(σ)) = o] > 0 and
Pr[f(σ) = j ∧ C(O(σ)) = o] > 0. We further say that classes i, j ∈ ΨP are n-ambiguous if there
exists a sequence (i0 = i, i1, i2, . . . , in = j) ∈ (ΨP)n+1 such that any two consecutive elements ik
and ik+1 are ambiguous.
We now have the following useful claim which says that, if a classifier does not satisfy subgroup
perfect prediction, then all classes can be connected by a “short” ambiguous sequence.
Claim 3. Consider some classifier C that does not satisfy subgroup perfect prediction with respect
to some context P = (D, f, g,O). Then for every pair of classes i, j ∈ ΨP , we have that i, j are
mi,j-ambiguous for some mi,j ≤ |ΨP | − 1.
Proof. Given a context P and a classifier C, consider a graph G with n = ΨP vertices, where we
draw an edge between two vertices i, j if i and j are ambiguous. Note that i, j are m-ambiguous if
and only if there exists a path of length m connecting them.
We show that the graph must be fully connected if C does not satisfy subgroup perfect prediction;
the proof of the claim immediately follows, as the shortest path between any two nodes in a fully
connected graph with n nodes can never be more than n− 1.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that G is not fully connected, yet C does not satisfy
subgroup perfect prediction. Then G must have a component ψ disconnected from the remainder
of the graph (which can be concretely found by, say, considering the set of all vertices reachable from
some class i ∈ ΨP). Then we notice that the set of outcomes that can be assigned to individuals with
classes in ψ must be entirely disjoint from the set of outcomes that can be assigned to individuals
with classes outside ψ; otherwise, there would by definition exist an edge between a vertex in ψ
and a vertex in ΨP \ ψ in the graph, contradicting our assumption that ψ is disconnected from
ΨP \ ψ. This contradicts our assumption that C does not satisfy subgroup perfect prediction.
The next lemma can be viewed as a weak form of the second part of Theorem 3. (In fact, for
the case of binary classification contexts, this lemma on its own directly implies Theorem 1 from
the introduction.) Looking forward, we will soon strengthen this lemma by repeatedly applying it
to prove the full Theorem 3. In the sequel, we say that a context P has ǫ-approximately equal
base rates if for every X,Y ∈ GP and every i ∈ ΨP ,
µ(Pr[f(σX) = i],Pr[f(σY ) = i]) ≤ ǫ
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Lemma 1. Let P be a context, let C be a classifier that satisfies ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-predictive
parity with respect to a context P, and let k = |ΨP |. Then either:
(1) P satisfies 4(k − 1)ǫ-approximately equal base rates, or
(2) C satisfies subgroup perfect prediction over P.
Proof. Let C be a classifier that satisfies ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-predictive parity with respect to P,
and let k = |ΨP |. We will show that either P satisfies 4(k− 1)ǫ-approximately equal base rates, or
C satisfies subgroup perfect prediction over P. Towards proving the lemma, let us introduce some
additional notation, and prove some helpful propositions:
• Let αiX = Pr[f(σX) = i] denote the base rate of the class i w.r.t. the group X.
• Let fi denote the event that f(σ) = i and let Co denote the event that C(O(σ)) = o.
• For any X ∈ GP , let fXi denote the event f(σX) = i and let CXo denote the event that
C(O(σX )) = o.
The following proposition is a generalization of the identity observed by Chouldechova in [4].
Proposition 2. Let i, j ∈ ΨP , o ∈ ΩCP , and i 6= j. Then, if Pr[fXi ∧ CXo ] > 0 and Pr[fXj ∧ CXo ] > 0,
we have:
Pr[CXo | fXi ]
Pr[CXo | fXj ]
=
Pr[fXj ]
Pr[fXi ]
Pr[fXi | CXo ]
Pr[fXj | CXo ]
for any X ∈ GP .
Proof. First observe that, if Pr[fXj ∧ CXo ] > 0, then it follows by conditional probability that
Pr[fXj | CXo ] > 0, Pr[CXo | fXj ] > 0, and also Pr[CXo ] > 0. Then the conclusion follows immediately:
Pr[CXo | fXi ]
Pr[CXo | fXj ]
=
Pr[CXo ∧ fXi ]/Pr[fXi ]
Pr[CXo ∧ fXj ]/Pr[fXj ]
=
Pr[fXj ]
Pr[fXi ]
Pr[fXi | CXo ]Pr[CXo ]
Pr[fXj | CXo ]Pr[CXo ]
=
Pr[fXj ]
Pr[fXi ]
Pr[fXi | CXo ]
Pr[fXj | CXo ]
We now use the above proposition to get a relationship between the base rate of any two classes
that are ambiguous.
Proposition 3. For any two groups X,Y ∈ GP , and any two classes i, j ∈ ΨP that are ambiguous
w.r.t. C, we have:
µ
(
αXi
αYi
,
αXj
αYj
)
≤ 4ǫ
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Proof. Consider any two X,Y ∈ GP , and any two classes i, j ∈ ΨP that are ambiguous w.r.t. C.
By ambiguity, there exists some o ∈ ΩC
P
such that
Pr[fi ∧ Co] > 0 and Pr[fj ∧ Co] > 0.
There thus must exist groups g1, g2 such that
Pr[f g1i ∧ Cg1o ] > 0 and Pr[f g2j ∧ Cg2o ] > 0.
By fair treatment between the pairs (g1,X), (g2,X), (g1, Y ), and (g2, Y ), it follows that
Pr[fXi ∧ CXo ] > 0, Pr[fXj ∧ CXo ] > 0, Pr[fYi ∧ CYo ] > 0, Pr[fYj ∧ CYo ] > 0.
We can thus apply Proposition 2 to conclude:
µ(Pr[CXo | fXi ]αXi Pr[fXj | CXo ],Pr[CXo | fXj ]αXj Pr[fXi | CXo ]) = 0
By fair treatment, µ(Pr[CXo | fXi ],Pr[CYo | fYi ]) ≤ ǫ and µ(Pr[CXo | fXj ],Pr[CYo | fYj ]) ≤ ǫ, thus7
µ(Pr[CYo | fYi ]αXi Pr[fXj | CXo ],Pr[CYo | fYj ]αXj Pr[fXi | CXo ]) ≤ 2ǫ
By predictive parity, µ(Pr[fXi | CXo ],Pr[fYi | CYo ]) ≤ ǫ and µ(Pr[fXj | CXo ],Pr[fYj | CYo ]) ≤ ǫ, thus
µ(Pr[CYo | fYi ]αXi Pr[fYj | CYo ],Pr[CYo | fYj ]αXj Pr[fYi | CYo ]) ≤ 4ǫ
But, by Proposition 2 applied to Y (since Pr[fYi ∧ CYo ] > 0 and Pr[fYj ∧ CYo ] > 0), it also follows
that:
µ(Pr[CYo | fYi ]αYi Pr[fYj | CYo ],Pr[CYo | fYj ]αYj Pr[fYi | CYo ]) = 0
So, dividing the last two expressions8 (which is possible since Pr[fXi ∧CXo ] > 0 and Pr[fXj ∧CXo ] > 0)
we conclude
µ
(
αXi
αYi
,
αXj
αYj
)
≤ 4ǫ
Armed with the above proposition, we turn to proving the lemma. Assume for contradiction
that P does not satisfy 4(k − 1)ǫ-approximately equal base rates, and that C does not satisfy
subgroup perfect prediction over P. Let n = k − 1; by Claim 3, we have that, for every pair of
classes i, j ∈ ΨP , i and j are mi,j-ambiguous for some mi,j ≤ n. By our assumption that P does
not satisfy 4nǫ-equal base rates, there exists some i ∈ ΨP and some X,Y ∈ GP such that
µ(αXi , α
Y
i ) > e
4nǫ.
Thus at least one of αXi and α
Y
i needs to be non-zero, and then by the definition of fair treatment,
we have that also the second one must be non-zero. Thus, either
αXi
αYi
> e4nǫ or
αXi
αYi
< e−4nǫ.
7using the fact that µ(ab, c) = x and µ(b, d) = y implies µ(ad, c) ≤ x+ y
8using the fact that µ(a/b, c/d) ≤ µ(a, c) + µ(b, d)
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We may assume without loss of generality that the former condition holds (as we may otherwise
switch X and Y ).
By our ambiguity assumptions, for any j ∈ ΨP , there is some m = mi,j ≤ n and an ambiguous
chain (i0 = i, i1, i2, . . . , im = j) ∈ (ΨP)m+1 so that any two consecutive elements is and is+1 are
ambiguous; in particular this means that Proposition 3 applies to any consecutive elements in the
sequence, and thus for every s ∈ [m− 1]
µ
(
αXis
αYis
,
αXis+1
αYis+1
)
≤ 4ǫ
Hence, iteratively employing Proposition 3, we have
αXi1
αYi1
> e4(n−1)ǫ,
αXi2
αYi2
> e4(n−2)ǫ, . . . ,
αXim
αYim
=
αXj
αYj
> e4(n−m)ǫ ≥ 1
Thus, for every j ∈ ΨP , we have that
αXj > α
Y
j
which is a contradiction since ∑
i∈ΨP
αXi =
∑
i∈ΨP
αYi = 1.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 3 (2)
In this section, we finally prove the second step of Theorem 3.
Proposition 4 (Theorem 3 (2).). Let ǫ < 3/2, let P be a classification context, and let C be a
classifier satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ/5-rational fairness with respect to P. Then P is 4(k−1)ǫ-
trivial, where k = |ΨP |.
Proof. Consider some classification context P; let ǫ < 3/2 be a constant and let k = |ΨP |. Assume
the existence of a classifier C satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ/5-rational fairness with respect to
P. We aim to show that P is 4(k − 1)ǫ-trivial.
First, note that by Corollary 1, we have that C also satisfies ǫ-predictive parity. To show that
P is 4(k − 1)ǫ-trivial, we shall repeatedly apply the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let P = (D, f, g,O) be a context (where |ΨP | = k) for which there exists a
classifier C satisfying ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-predictive parity with respect to P.
Let Ψ1, . . . ,Ψm be a partitioning of ΨP into subsets such that, for any i, j ∈ [m] with i 6= j,
the distributions
{O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψi} and {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψj}
have disjoint support. Then, either of the following conditions must hold.
• For any two groups X,Y in GP , and any i ∈ [m],
µ(Pr[f(σX) = c | f(σX) ∈ Ψi],Pr[f(σY ) = c | f(σY ) ∈ Ψi]) ≤ 4(k − 1)ǫ
(i.e., X and Y have approximately equal base rates conditioned on each subset of classes Ψi).
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• There exists some i and some partition of Ψi into proper subsets Ψ0i , Ψ1i such that the
distributions {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψ0i } and {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψ1i } have disjoint support.
Proof. Consider P, C,Ψ1, . . . ,Ψm satisfying the premise of the proposition. Let Di be the distri-
bution over σ obtained by conditioning D on the event that f(σ) ∈ Ψi. We claim that C also
satisfies ǫ-fair treatment and ǫ-predictive parity with respect to each context Pi = (Di, f, g,O), as
the conditional distributions over which they are defined are unchanged if we restrict to f(σ) ∈ Ψi.
For fair treatment, this is obvious as for any c ∈ Ψi, conditioning on f(σ) = c is equivalent to
conditioning on f(σ) = c ∧ f(σ) ∈ Ψi (as these events are the same).
For predictive parity, notice that because the distributions {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψi} are mutually
disjoint, there is also a partition Ω1, . . . ,Ωm of the outcome space Ω
C
P
such that C(O(σ)) ∈ Ωi if and
only if f(σ) ∈ Ψi. Thus conditioning on f(σ) ∈ Ψi is equivalent to conditioning on C(O(σ)) ∈ Ωi.
We conclude that conditioning on C(O(σ)) = o ∧ f(σ) ∈ Ψi (whenever this event happens with
positive probability) is equivalent to conditioning on C(O(σ)) = o∧ C(O(σ)) ∈ Ωi which in turn is
equivalent to conditioning on just C(O(σ)) = o.
Hence, for C and each context Pi, we can apply Lemma 1, showing that either Pi has 4(k− 1)ǫ-
approximately equal base rates, or C satisfies subgroup perfect prediction with respect to Pi. In
case all Pi satisfy 4(k−1)ǫ-approximately equal base rates, we are done (we are satisfying condition
1 in the proposition). Otherwise, there must exist some i such that C satisfies subgroup perfect
prediction with respect to Pi; that is, there some proper subset ψ of Ψi such that the distributions
{C(O(σ)) | f(σ) ∈ ψ} and {C(O(σ)) | f(σ) 6∈ ψ} have disjoint support (when σ is defined over
Di), which in turn means that the distributions {O(σ)f(σ) ∈ ψ} and {O(σ) | f(σ) 6∈ ψ} also have
disjoint support. Hence we may partition Ψi into Ψ
0
i = Ψi \ ψ and Ψ1i = ψ to satisfy the second
condition of the proposition (relying on the fact that {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψi} has disjoint support
from the support of {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψj} for every j 6= i, and thus so will {O(σ) | f(σ) ∈ Ψbi} for
b ∈ {0, 1}).
Now, noticing that we may partition ΨP into at most |ΨP | = k distinct subsets, we can apply
Proposition 5 repeatedly at most k − 1 times (starting with Ψ1 = ΨP , every time increasing the
number of partitions by one (by replacing Ψi with Ψ
0
i and Ψ
1
i ). Thus, when we can no longer
further partition some subset Ψi, the first condition from the proposition must hold, and thus we
have “4(k − 1)ǫ-approximately equal base rates conditioned on Ψi” for every i. We conclude that
P is 4(k − 1)ǫ-trivial, which completes the proof of Theorem 3 (2).
4.5 Concluding the Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 follows as a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Proposition 4. This concludes the
proof of the main theorem.
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A Fair Treatment and Post-Processing
We here remark that the notion of fair treatment is closed under “post-processing”. If a classifier
C satisfies ǫ-fair treatment with respect to a context P = (D, f, g,O), then for any (possibly
probabilistic) function M, C′(·) =M(C(·)) will also satisfy ǫ-fair treatment with respect to P.
Theorem 4. Let C1 be a classifier satisfying ǫ-fair treatment with respect to context P = (D, f, g,O).
Let C2 be any classifier over the context P ′ = (D, f, g, C1(O(·))) Then C2 satisfies ǫ-fair treatment
with respect to P ′.
Proof. Let C1 be a classifier satisfying ǫ-fair treatment w.r.t. some context P. Consider some
groups X,Y ∈ GP , some class c ∈ ΨP , and some outcome o ∈ ΩC′P ; we need to show that
µ(Pr[C2(C1(O(σX))) = o | f(σX) = c],Pr[C2(C1O(σY ))) = o | f(σY ) = c]) ≤ ǫ
Towards doing this, note that
Pr[C2(C1(O(σX))) = o | f(σX) = c]
=
∑
o1∈Ω
C1
P
Pr[C2(o1) = o | f(σX) = c, C1(o) = o1]Pr[C1(O(σX)) = o | f(σX) = c]
=
∑
o1∈Ω
C1
P
Pr[C2(o1) = o | C1(o) = o1]Pr[C1(O(σX)) = o | f(σX) = c]
By the same argument applied to Y , we also have that:
Pr[C2(C1(O(σY ))) = o | f(σY ) = c]
=
∑
o1∈Ω
C1
P
Pr[C2(o1) = o | C1(o) = o1]Pr[C1(O(σY )) = o | f(σY ) = c]
These two probabilities are ǫ-close since, by fair treatment, Pr[C1(O(σX)) = o | f(σX) = c] and
Pr[C1(O(σY )) = o | f(σY ) = c] are ǫ-close, and furthermore by the fact that multiplicative distance
is preserved under linear operations9. This proves the theorem.
Expectation-based notions are not closed under post-processing. Let us also remark that
earlier “expectation-based” definitions of fair treatment are not preserved under post-processing.
Assume we have some non-binary finite outcome space of scores Ω ⊂ [0, 1], similar to the notion
of “risk scores” proposed in [9], and that we define fair treatment as requiring that, conditioned
on a particular class, the expected outcome for an individual must be within eǫ multiplicatively
between the two groups (as the notion considered in [9]). Now consider the following example of a
threshold classifier which does not preserve this definition of fair treatment:
• Assume O = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, and that, for some class c, individuals in groups X and Y
with class c are classified by some classifier C according to the following distributions:
9That is, if µ(a, b) ≤ ǫ and µ(a′, b′) ≤ ǫ then µ(αa+ βa′, αb+ βb′) ≤ ǫ.
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0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Group X 50% 0% 0% 50% 0%
Group Y 50% 0% 25% 0% 25%
• Clearly, the expected score C(σ) of individuals in class c is the same for groups X and Y
(0.375 for both); if we assume that all individuals in other classes are assigned a random
classification by C, then we observe that C satisfies errorless fair treatment by the variant
definition above.
• However, if we create a threshold classifier C′ that outputs 0 if C(σ) < 0.75 and 1 if C(σ) ≥ 0.75,
then we notice that, of individuals in class c, 50% in group X receive a score of 1 under C′,
while only 25% in group Y receive a score of 1. Hence, C′ does not preserve the same
fair treatment error as C (as the expected scores of groups X and Y conditioned on c are 0.5
and 0.25, respectively).
Intuitively, the reason for this failure in closure under post-processing is that an expectation-
based notion of fair treatment does not necessarily account for base differences in the distributions
of outcomes (conditioned on a particular class)—indeed, two distributions may have the same
expectation but be quite different. We lastly note that this issue is not present for binary classi-
fiers (i.e., classifiers that output just a single bit), since for such classifiers the expectation-based
definition is equivalent to our definition.
B On the Use of Multiplicative Distance
We here motivate our use of a multiplicative notion of distance (i.e., max-divergence) as opposed to
an additive notion of distance (such as statistical distance, i.e., the total variation norm). Consider
a classifier used to determine whether to search people for weapons. Assume such a classifier
determined to search 1% of minorities at random, but only the minorities (and no others). Such a
classifier would still have a fair treatment error of 0.01 if we used the total variation norm, while
the max-divergence would in fact be infinite (and indeed, such a classification would be blatantly
discriminatory).
Our use of max-divergence between distributions for our definitions is reflective of the fact that,
in cases where we have such small probabilities, discrimination should be measured multiplicatively,
rather than additively. In addition, when we may have a large number of possible classes, the use
of max-divergence (in particular, the maximum of the log-probability ratios) means that we always
look at the class with the most disparity to determine how discriminatory a classification is, rather
than potentially amortizing this disparity over a large number of classes.
25
